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JORDAN, Circuit Judge 
 Matthew Kolodesh appeals from his conviction and 
sentence following a trial in the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania based on his 
involvement in a Medicare fraud scheme.  We will affirm. 
 
I. Background1 
 
 Kolodesh owned a home-health services company 
called Community Home Health, Inc.  Around 1999, he 
approached one of his employees, Alex Pugman, with the 
idea of starting a company to provide home-based hospice 
care.  Pugman, who had a background in hospice care, 
agreed.  Kolodesh funded the new company, which they 
named Home Care Hospice, Inc., and Pugman managed the 
day-to-day operations.  Kolodesh’s wife, Malvina 
Yakobashvili, and Pugman were listed as owning equal shares 
in the company; however, Kolodesh was intimately involved 
in forming and overseeing the management of Home Care 
Hospice.  
 
 As early as 2000 or 2001, Kolodesh, Pugman, and 
Pugman’s wife, Svetlana Ganetsky, who was also employed 
                                              
 1 The following general background information is 
supplemented by additional facts as they relate to each 
argument raised on appeal.  Because Kolodesh was convicted 
after a jury trial, “we must defer to the jury’s verdict and view 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the government.  
Therefore, we recount the government’s version of the facts.”  
United States v. Serafini, 233 F.3d 758, 763 n.4 (3d Cir. 
2000) (citation omitted). 
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by Home Care Hospice, began giving gifts and cash 
“kickbacks” to doctors in exchange for patient referrals.  
(App. at 979-82.)  In addition, at Kolodesh’s suggestion, 
Pugman placed some doctors or their employees on the Home 
Care Hospice payroll with sham job titles.  Those sham 
employees were then issued paychecks, in exchange for 
patient referrals.   
 
 About 90% of the revenue generated by Home Care 
Hospice came from Medicare reimbursements.  Medicare, as 
is well known, is a federal health benefits program providing 
financial assistance to senior and disabled citizens to cover 
medical costs.  Fischer v. United States, 529 U.S. 667, 671 
(2000).  “Medicare attains its objectives through an elaborate 
funding structure,” id. at 673, one aspect of which involves 
reimbursement to health care providers for medical treatment 
costs incurred in furnishing services to Medicare recipients, 
id. at 677, 680.  Providers are reimbursed by the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) through a “fiscal 
intermediary,” which is a private entity that contracts with 
CMS to help it administer the Medicare program by 
determining payment amounts and making payments.  42 
U.S.C. §§ 1395h(a), 1395kk-1(a); 42 C.F.R. § 405.902; see 
also Fischer, 529 U.S. at 677.  
 
 At some point, Home Care Hospice began to submit to 
CMS fraudulent claims for reimbursement.  Medicare 
provides reimbursement only for hospice patients certified as 
terminally ill and places time limits on the validity of such 
certifications, 42 C.F.R. §§ 418.21-.22, but, at Kolodesh’s 
suggestion, Home Care Hospice began submitting 
reimbursement claims for patients who did not qualify for 
hospice care.  Kolodesh and Pugman had the employees of 
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Home Care Hospice falsify patient records to conceal the 
fraud.  Home Care Hospice employees also falsified records 
to show patients as eligible for and receiving continuous care 
– a more time-intensive and thus more expensive level of care 
– when those patients were neither eligible for nor received 
such care.    
 
 To surreptitiously extract value from Home Care 
Hospice, Kolodesh and Pugman would, among other things, 
have contractors, such as Alexy Drobot, the person who 
serviced the copy machine for the business, submit fake 
invoices that Home Care Hospice would pay, and then the 
contractor would give most of the money to Kolodesh and 
Pugman, while keeping a portion for himself.   
 
 Kolodesh, Pugman, Ganetsky, and a number of others 
were charged for their roles in the scheme to defraud 
Medicare.  Kolodesh in particular was charged with one count 
of conspiracy to defraud a health care benefit program, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349, twenty-one counts of health-
care fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1347, two counts of 
mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, and eleven 
counts of money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957.  
At the conclusion of a five-week trial, in which Pugman and 
Ganetsky testified for the government after having pled 
guilty, the jury convicted Kolodesh on all counts.  Kolodesh 
filed a motion for a new trial and, later, a supplemental 
motion for a new trial, both of which the District Court 
denied.  On May 28, 2014, the District Court sentenced him 
to a total of 176 months’ imprisonment, with three years of 
supervised release.  The Court also ordered restitution in the 
amount of $16.2 million.  Kolodesh filed this timely appeal. 
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II. Discussion2 
 
 The arguments on appeal focus on allegations of 
prosecutorial misconduct, certain evidentiary issues, and 
supposed errors in responding to a request from the jury and 
in sentencing.3  We address each in turn. 
 
                                              
 2 The District Court had original jurisdiction under 18 
U.S.C. § 3231; we have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. 
 3 In support of the arguments raised in his opening 
brief, Kolodesh raises several new contentions in his reply 
brief.  Those are waived and we do not address them further.  
See United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(“It is well settled that an appellant’s failure to identify or 
argue an issue in his opening brief constitutes waiver of that 
issue on appeal.”). 
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 A. Prosecutorial Misconduct4 
 
 Kolodesh argues that the government committed 
prosecutorial misconduct in two ways.  First, he says the 
prosecutor improperly introduced and repeatedly referred to 
an inaccurately transcribed, irrelevant, and unduly prejudicial 
portion of a recorded conversation between Kolodesh and 
Pugman.  Second, he says the prosecutor improperly elicited 
testimony about Russian stereotypes, which undermined the 
fairness of the trial.  
 
   1. Transcript of Wiretapped Conversations 
 
 At trial, the government relied heavily on transcripts of 
conversations that had been recorded through wiretaps that 
the FBI placed at Home Care Hospice.  One such 
                                              
 4 Kolodesh did not lodge a contemporaneous objection 
to the prosecutor’s conduct; rather, he raised the issue for the 
first time in his motion for a new trial.  We therefore review 
the District Court proceedings for plain error insofar as this 
argument is concerned.  United States v. Brennan, 326 F.3d 
176, 188 (3d Cir. 2003).  Under that standard, “an appellate 
court may, in its discretion, correct an error not raised at trial 
only where the appellant demonstrates that (1) there is an 
error; (2) the error is clear or obvious, rather than subject to 
reasonable dispute; (3) the error affected the appellant’s 
substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means it 
affected the outcome of the district court proceedings; and (4) 
the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings.”  United States v. Marcus, 
560 U.S. 258, 262 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(alteration in original). 
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conversation between Kolodesh and Pugman related to a 
letter that a Medicare fiscal intermediary, Cahaba 
Government Benefit Administrators, LLC (“Cahaba”), sent to 
Home Care Hospice.  The letter requested patient data for the 
2006-2007 fiscal year to determine whether Home Care 
Hospice’s claims had exceeded the cap for new patients, the 
cap being a limit on the total annual amount CMS would 
reimburse for each hospice patient.  The letter requested the 
number of new patients admitted during a defined period, but, 
depending on how the letter was interpreted, the period could 
be understood to be twelve or thirteen months.  Knowing that 
they had overbilled Medicare, Kolodesh and Pugman decided 
to submit thirteen months of data and to misrepresent several 
patients as new when they had been previously discharged but 
since readmitted.  During the recorded conversation, 
Kolodesh said to Pugman, “We have to f*** them over this 
time, one more time and be smart about it … .”  (App. at 
1261.)  The government referred to this comment twice in its 
opening statement and four times in its closing argument.  
Kolodesh did not object to any of those references.5 
 
  Calling his remark the “F*** Medicare Statement,” 
Kolodesh now argues that the translation and transcription of 
it, which was originally in Russian, was inaccurate.  (Opening 
Br. at 19.)  He also says that the government should have told 
the jury that the statement did not appear in the original 
transcription of the conversation.  According to Kolodesh, the 
failure to get a good translation and the failure to tell the jury 
that his F*** Medicare Statement appeared only in the later 
                                              
 5 Kolodesh did object to questions to Pugman about 
what Kolodesh meant, but not to the admissibility of the 
statement itself or the government’s use of that statement.  
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transcription constitute prosecutorial misconduct.  He seems 
to forget, however, that he stipulated at trial to the truth and 
accuracy of the transcripts.  He thus invited any error and 
cannot complain now.  United States v. Stewart, 185 F.3d 
112, 127 (3d Cir. 1999) (limiting plain-error review to errors 
that were not invited); see also United States v. Console, 13 
F.3d 641, 660 (3d Cir. 1993) (“A defendant cannot complain 
on appeal of alleged errors invited or induced by himself, 
particularly where, as here, it is not clear that the defendant 
was prejudiced thereby.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 
 Kolodesh also argues that the government’s reliance 
on the F*** Medicare Statement constitutes misconduct 
because it was irrelevant to the crimes charged in the 
indictment.  On the contrary, though, his crude and concise 
comment was directly relevant to the twenty-one counts of 
health care fraud.  It helped establish the fraudulent nature of 
the claims his company submitted and his mental state in 
causing those submissions.   
 
 The statement was also relevant to the charged 
conspiracy.  Among the overt acts supporting that charge, the 
indictment listed the obstruction of a Medicare audit in early 
2007.  That 2007 audit was separate from the later inquiry by 
Cahaba that prompted the F*** Medicare Statement during 
the recorded conversation.  In February 2007, Cahaba sent 
Home Care Hospice a letter notifying it that Cahaba would 
conduct a prepayment audit for twenty to forty claims 
covering a portion of the 2005-2006 fiscal year.  Kolodesh 
directed Pugman to bring one of their field nurses into the 
office and pay her specifically to assist in changing patient 
records so that they would appear to be compliant.  As a 
result, the audit led to the denial of only two claims out of 
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twenty.  Kolodesh’s statement, “‘We have to f*** them over 
this time, one more time and be smart about it …’” (App. at 
1261 (emphasis added)), is relevant to establishing the 
fraudulent nature of Home Care Hospice’s response to the 
2007 audit, as well as being relevant to Kolodesh’s 
corresponding mental state and to the existence of an 
agreement to defraud Medicare.  Thus, the District Court did 
not plainly err in permitting Kolodesh’s own words to be 
admitted against him and allowing the government to refer to 
them freely.6 
 
  2. Russian Stereotype Testimony 
 
 Kolodesh argues that the government committed 
prosecutorial misconduct by repeatedly eliciting testimony 
from witnesses that Russians “game the system,” which 
                                              
 6 Kolodesh also makes reference to Rules 403 and 
404(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.  Any argument 
based on improper character evidence under Rule 404(a) is 
waived due to the cursory nature of the reference to it in the 
brief.  See United States v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137, 162 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (noting parenthetically that “[a]n issue is waived 
unless a party raises it in its opening brief, and for those 
purposes a passing reference to an issue will not suffice to 
bring that issue before this court”); see also Fed. R. App. P. 
28(a)(8).  Kolodesh’s Rule 403 argument – that the 
inflammatory nature of the single instance of profanity 
rendered the comment unfairly prejudicial – fails, particularly 
in light of its probative value.  Cf. United States v. Pirani, 406 
F.3d 543, 555 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (concluding that tape 
recording where defendant was “swearing expressively” was 
not unfairly prejudicial). 
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testimony the government then used to “assert to the jury that 
Kolodesh must be guilty because … [he] was born in 
Russia.”7  (Opening Br. at 37.)  He misstates the record.  
First, the prosecutors did not elicit a majority of the 
statements of which Kolodesh complains; rather, those 
references to Russians were offered by witnesses without any 
prompting by the government.8  And statements that arguably 
were elicited by the prosecutors are relatively innocuous in 
the context of this case.  The nurses at Home Care Hospice 
                                              
 7 Kolodesh was originally from the Georgian Soviet 
Socialist Republic, but he casts his argument on appeal 
broadly to include not only “Russian ethnic stereotypes” but 
also stereotypes about “native Russians,” “Russian speakers,” 
and, more generically, the “Russian community” in the 
United States, with which Kolodesh was identified at trial.  
(Opening Br. at 37, 38.)   
 8 For example, one of the prosecutors engaged in the 
following exchange with Pugman: 
Q Are you familiar with the concept of a 
continuous care schedule? 
A Yes. 
Q What is that? 
A So, if Irina as coordinator on Russian 
team would come to me and by that time, 
let’s say, in the year 2007-2008, 
especially nurses on the Russian team, 
they loved continuous care.  Continuous 
care meant a lot of money, of course, 
some work in terms of documenting, but 
then getting paid for this. 
(App. at 1016-17.) 
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were divided into a “Russian team” and an “English team,” 
with each team focusing on patients who spoke those 
respective languages.  (App. at 956-58.)  When asked which 
team was involved with most of the fraudulent claims, 
Pugman stated matter-of-factly that it was the Russian team, 
without elaborating on the reasons.  When Ganetsky was 
asked whether any nurses refused to participate in the fraud, 
she responded, “None of the Russian nurses had a problem 
with fabricating charts.”  (App. at 2531.)  But she 
immediately followed with the statement that, “[o]n the 
English team, there was a nurse who refused to participate,” 
making it clear that participation in the fraudulent scheme did 
not break down strictly along ethnic, linguistic, or cultural 
lines.9  (Id.; see also id. at 1031-32 (Pugman testifying that “a 
couple of nurses” refused to participate, without specifying 
which team, and stating by way of illustration that if he 
approached a nurse on the English team who refused, he 
would simply approach another nurse on the English team 
and offer to pay her double to do it).)  In another instance 
cited by Kolodesh, Pugman stated that Kolodesh told him 
“how the marketing is done in [the] Russian community.”  
(App. at 963.)  When the prosecutor asked for further details, 
Pugman recounted Kolodesh’s explanation of how he would 
provide doctors cash kickbacks for referrals.  Yet that 
testimony must be considered in the context of other 
evidence, such as Pugman’s testimony that both “Russian” 
and “American” doctors received kickbacks for giving 
referrals, though the former preferred cash kickbacks while 
                                              
 9 If the fraudulent activity had broken cleanly on such 
lines, that would be a matter of fact, not bias.  That it did not 
do so simply reduces any force in the argument that there was 
a risk that the jury would succumb to prejudice.  
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the latter preferred to be placed on the payroll.10  (App. at 
1214.)   
 
 The government did not invoke Russian stereotypes in 
its opening statement or closing argument to the jury.  The 
only references to ethnicity or language groups came in 
closing argument and involved a reference to how each group 
of doctors – Russian speakers and English-only speakers – 
preferred to receive kickbacks and a reference to a statement 
by Ganetsky that she believed the co-conspirators would be 
suspected of fraud because they were Russians.  The 
prosecutor used the latter statement not to prove that Russians 
were predisposed toward fraudulent activity, but to suggest 
that Ganetsky, Pugman, and Kolodesh believed that Home 
Care Hospice was about to come under closer scrutiny, and 
that their subsequent efforts to discharge large numbers of 
inappropriate patients indicated knowledge of the fraudulent 
nature of their actions.  Thus, the government did not, as 
Kolodesh alleges, “broadcast” Russian stereotypes to the jury.  
(Opening Br. at 40.)  Viewed in the context of the evidence 
presented at trial, the prosecutors’ questions and statements 
do not constitute misconduct, nor was it plain error for the 
District Court to permit them.11 
                                              
 10 The final statement Kolodesh cites that was actually 
elicited by the prosecutors was Kolodesh’s own comment that 
he is “savvy … like all Russians.”  (App. at 1121.)  But the 
context of Kolodesh’s statement indicates that he was 
referring to why he prefers the cash-basis accounting method 
to the accrual-basis method; he was not referring to fraudulent 
activity. 
 11 Kolodesh further argues that testimony concerning 
Russians was inappropriate because none of the witnesses 
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 B. Evidentiary Issues12 
 
 Next, Kolodesh alleges a series of evidentiary errors; 
namely, the District Court’s exclusion of allegedly 
exculpatory medical evidence, its failure both to exclude 
evidence of uncharged wrongful acts and to allow Kolodesh 
to rebut that evidence, and its admission of conversations 
relating to his attempt to open an overseas bank account. 
 
                                                                                                     
were qualified “as expert witnesses on the propensity of 
Russian people to commit crimes.”  (Opening Br. at 39.)  
That argument is frivolous.  When Ganetsky attempted to 
testify as to how business was conducted at “other Russian 
agencies,” Kolodesh objected and that objection was 
sustained.  (App. at 2532.)  Otherwise, the testimony 
Kolodesh cites all involved witnesses explaining the facts of 
this case based on personal knowledge.  See Fed. R. Evid. 701 
(stating that opinion testimony of a lay witness is permitted if, 
among other things, it is “rationally based on the witness’s 
perception”).  Kolodesh also mentions a litany of other 
evidentiary rules that were supposedly violated by admitting 
testimony that he says involved Russian stereotypes.  Those 
arguments are not meaningfully briefed and are thus waived.  
Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8); Hoffecker, 530 F.3d at 162. 
 12 “Generally, we review evidentiary rulings for abuse 
of discretion, but when no objection is made at trial we 
review for plain error only.”  United States v. Brink, 39 F.3d 
419, 425 (3d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). 
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  1. Exclusion of Evidence of Medical  
   Condition 
 
 Kolodesh argues that the District Court abused its 
discretion by preventing him from countering Pugman’s 
testimony that Kolodesh met him at the office almost daily.  
Kolodesh says he had evidence that he was homebound due 
to illness from 2003 to 2005.  He contends that, because the 
illegal activity began in earnest in 2003, the excluded 
evidence would have provided “exculpatory alibi testimony” 
showing that he “was physically too ill to be involved in the 
operation of [Home Care Hospice]” at that time.  (Opening 
Br. at 42.)  If the Court erred in this respect – and it appears it 
did – the error was harmless. 
 
 Kolodesh called his wife, Yakobashvili, as a witness 
and attempted to have her testify as to his health.  The District 
Court ruled that Yakobashvili had personal knowledge to 
testify as to “whether he got up in the morning and went or 
left the house,” but testimony that illness was the reason he 
could not go to work would be hearsay.  (App. at 4275.)  
When Yakobashvili repeatedly ignored the scope of defense 
counsel’s questions and testified not only that Kolodesh was 
“[n]ot really” going into work at Community Home Health, 
but that the reason was that he was “very sick,” the District 
Court cut off questioning and ordered defense counsel to 
move on.  (App. at 4276.)  
 
 “Testimony that conveys a witness’s personal 
knowledge about a matter is not hearsay.”  United States v. 
Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 539 n.27 (3d Cir. 2010).  The 
proffered testimony could be understood to establish that 
Yakobashvili had personal knowledge that her husband was 
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ill in some way and that the illness had an effect on his ability 
to work.  That testimony could certainly have been subjected 
to close scrutiny under cross-examination, but her 
impressions of her husband’s health and capacity to work 
were not hearsay.13  However, even if Kolodesh had been 
allowed to pursue that line of questioning, it would not have 
affected the outcome of the trial.  We are quite sure of that.  
See United States v. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252, 1265 (3d Cir. 
1995) (en banc) (stating that an error is harmless “when it is 
highly probable that the error did not contribute to the 
judgment,” which “requires that the court possess a sure 
conviction that the error did not prejudice the defendant” 
(emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 
 Kolodesh wanted Yakobashvili to testify as to his 
health between 2003 and 2005.  The incriminating evidence 
that Kolodesh identifies as being undermined by such 
testimony, however, refers to Kolodesh’s almost-daily office 
visits with Pugman during 2000 and 2006.  Elsewhere, 
Pugman testified that he and Kolodesh had “always” been in 
“communication” on a daily basis, including in 2003 (App. at 
1051), and that some of their conversations took place over 
the phone.  Furthermore, Pugman testified that, starting 
sometime in 2004, he and Kolodesh began having meetings 
after business hours in Kolodesh’s home, though “rarely” in 
Pugman’s home because Kolodesh “was more comfortable” 
in his own house.  (App. at 967.)  While Pugman also testified 
that he and Kolodesh “[s]ometimes, [but] not that often,” met 
                                              
 13 Yakobashvili’s attempt to identify the particular 
illness that her husband had may be another matter.  But the 
District Court could have limited that testimony without 
excluding all reference to Kolodesh’s health.  
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at Community Home Health during 2004 (App. at 968), that 
testimony comports with Yakobashvili’s testimony that in 
2004 – in the midst of the period that she testified her 
husband was ill – Kolodesh had a meeting with Pugman, 
Ganetsky, and Yakobashvili at Community Home Health.14  
Because Yakobashvili’s proffered testimony did not 
demonstrate that Kolodesh was not involved in the operation 
of Home Care Hospice during 2003 to 2005, it failed to 
contradict Pugman’s testimony or to materially weaken his 
credibility.  The decision to exclude Yakobashvili’s testimony 
about Kolodesh’s illness was, therefore, harmless. 
 
  2. Other-Acts Evidence Regarding   
   Community Home Health 
 
 Kolodesh argues that the District Court erred in not 
sua sponte excluding testimony by Pugman and Ganetsky that 
employees at Community Home Health engaged in certain 
uncharged acts of fraud.  Pugman testified that he learned 
how to fraudulently alter charts in preparation for an audit 
while working at Community Home Health.  He said that the 
director of nursing would instruct him to “fix[]” the charts, 
but if, for example, he refused to come in on the weekend to 
do so when he had other plans, he would get a call from 
Kolodesh urging him to come in and help.  (App. at 1047.)  
                                              
 14 Kolodesh also claims that Pugman testified that 
Kolodesh “regularly came to [Home Care Hospice] to review 
the books.”  (Opening Br. at 41.)  But what Pugman actually 
said is that Kolodesh came to Home Care Hospice to review 
the company’s books “[o]n [an] as-needed basis.”  (App. at 
978.)  Furthermore, Pugman provided no timeframe for that 
statement.  
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Similarly, Ganetsky testified that, when she was working at 
Community Home Health, Kolodesh instructed her “on 
several occasions” to fabricate records for his mother-in-law, 
indicating that she received services that were, in fact, never 
provided.15  (App. at 2605.)  Ganetsky also testified that 
Kolodesh told Pugman that he had “several ghost employees” 
on the payroll at Community Home Health, and that the same 
kind of fraud should be undertaken at Home Care Hospice.  
(App. at 2507.) 
 
 Evidence of uncharged acts is admissible if the 
following requirements are met:  “First, the evidence must be 
offered for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b)[ of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence]; second, the evidence must be 
relevant under Rule 402; and third, the probative value of the 
evidence must outweigh its potential for unfair prejudice 
under Rule 403.”  United States v. Ciavarella, 716 F.3d 705, 
                                              
 15 Kolodesh further complains of testimony that, on 
behalf of Home Care Hospice, Ganetsky entered into 
unlawful kickback arrangements with Community Home 
Health staff.  That testimony, though, refers to illegal actions 
that are part of the crimes charged – the indictment 
specifically mentions the kickback scheme as a method of 
enrolling inappropriate hospice patients in Home Care 
Hospice.  Such testimony does not, therefore, relate to 
evidence of uncharged wrongs, and, even if it did, it would be 
intrinsic to the charged offense.  United States v. Gibbs, 190 
F.3d 188, 217 (3d Cir. 1999) (“Rule 404(b), which proscribes 
the admission of evidence of other crimes when offered to 
prove bad character, does not apply to evidence of uncharged 
offenses committed by a defendant when those acts are 
intrinsic to the proof of the charged offense.”). 
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728 (3d Cir. 2013).  The District Court did not plainly err in 
admitting the testimony of Pugman’s and Ganetsky’s 
experiences at Community Home Health.  The testimony was 
not offered as evidence of Kolodesh’s character as a 
defrauder in order to show that he acted in accordance with 
that character at Home Care Hospice.  See Fed. R. Evid. 
404(b)(1).  Rather, it was offered as circumstantial evidence 
of Kolodesh’s knowledge of the fraudulent activity at Home 
Care Hospice.  In his opening statement, defense counsel 
asserted that Kolodesh was unaware of the fraudulent 
practices at Home Care Hospice, and that the scheme was 
concocted and executed by Ganetsky and Pugman.  Counsel 
asserted that, in contrast, Kolodesh ran Community Home 
Health as a legal, legitimate business.  In light of the defense 
theory of the case, the relevance of the government’s 
evidence is clear: Kolodesh knew what fraudulent practices 
looked like – indeed, he taught them to Pugman and Ganetsky 
– and if Kolodesh was as intimately involved in Home Care 
Hospice as Pugman testified, he certainly would have known 
of the fraudulent conduct.  Given the relevance of the 
complained-of evidence, we cannot say it was unfairly 
prejudicial, especially when seen through the lens of plain-
error review. 
 
 Kolodesh also argues that he should have been allowed 
to rebut that evidence by offering testimony about how he 
operated Community Home Health after Pugman left that 
company in 2001.  At trial, Kolodesh sought to call three 
witnesses who worked at Community Home Health to 
counter the government’s evidence that he had instructed 
employees to fabricate records.  The District Court allowed 
him to call the witnesses but limited their testimony to events 
“up to 2001,” when Pugman left to work full time at Home 
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Care Hospice, because the government’s evidence had been 
similarly limited.  (App. at 4111.)  The Court stated, however, 
that it would revisit its ruling if Kolodesh could demonstrate 
that the government’s evidence relative to Community Home 
Health went beyond 2001.  Defense counsel responded that 
Ganetsky testified about her experience at Community Home 
Health up until about 2003 or 2004 , but he agreed to put on 
his witnesses and limit their testimony to 2001 and earlier, 
and then bring the witnesses back later “if [he felt] it’s that 
essential to bring them back.”16  (App. at 4114.)  The 
witnesses then testified that, during the 1999-2001 time 
period, Kolodesh never instructed them to fabricate records.  
Defense counsel also followed up with the first of the three 
witnesses in a way that extended the testimony beyond 2001: 
 
Q And that was the whole time that you 
worked there, right?  
A Yes. 
Q And you still work there now, right? 
A Yes. 
 
(App. at 4141.)  The government did not object, though it 
objected to a similarly broad question posed to the second 
witness.   
 
                                              
 16 Defense counsel also added, “[I]n reality, I don’t 
think it makes a whole lot of difference.”  (App. at 4114.)  
However, it is unclear whether that statement was a 
concession as to the value of additional testimony or a 
reference to the logistical matter of whether to put witnesses 
on then or after having had an opportunity to review 
Pugman’s and Ganetsky’s testimony.  
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 The District Court acted well within its discretion by 
allowing Kolodesh to rebut the government’s evidence while 
partially limiting the temporal scope of the testimony.  To 
prevent the trial about fraudulent practices at Home Care 
Hospice from devolving into a side trial about fraudulent 
practices at Community Home Health, the Court’s ruling was 
entirely reasonable.  But, even if we were to conclude that the 
District Court abused its discretion, its ruling was harmless.  
Kolodesh’s witnesses testified that he never asked them to 
doctor any charts, and one witness testified to that fact well 
beyond the 2001 limit.  We are fully persuaded that the 
admission of additional testimony about Kolodesh’s practices 
at Community Home Health after 2001 would not have 
affected the outcome of the case.  See Zehrbach, 47 F.3d at 
1265 (setting forth test for harmless error). 
 
  3. Relevance of Conversations Regarding  
   Overseas Bank Accounts 
 
 The final evidentiary challenge Kolodesh advances is 
to the relevance and prejudicial effect of extensive recorded 
conversations that referred to his opening a Swiss bank 
account.  Kolodesh argues that evidence of foreign 
investments is “generally inadmissible” because of the 
negative perception in the public’s mind linking such 
accounts to criminal activity.  (Opening Br. at 47.)  Yet the 
case Kolodesh cites for that proposition does not support it.  
Rather, the case simply applied the standard rules relating to 
relevance and unfair prejudice, with the result being the 
approval of admission of evidence of a secret Swiss bank 
account.  United States v. Friedland, 660 F.2d 919, 929 (3d 
Cir. 1981); cf. United States v. Udeozor, 515 F.3d 260, 264-
65 (4th Cir. 2008) (“Rule 403 is a rule of inclusion, generally 
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favoring admissibility … .” (brackets and internal quotation 
marks omitted)).  Here, Pugman testified that he, Ganetsky, 
and Kolodesh discussed the possibility of moving money 
overseas “to protect our money … from the government,” 
after they had received a letter from Cahaba requiring Home 
Care Hospice to repay over $2.6 million in reimbursements 
that had exceeded the per-patient cap for the 2006-2007 fiscal 
year.  (App. at 1280.)  Although Cahaba retracted the letter 
and at trial the government conceded that the letter was 
prompted by “a bookkeeping error” (App. at 4399), which 
Home Care Hospice corrected, the government argued – and 
the testimony supports – that the letter prompted Kolodesh 
and his co-conspirators to discharge several patients and 
discuss the possibility of moving money overseas because 
they were aware of fraudulent activity that would be detected 
if Cahaba continued to scrutinize Home Care Hospice.  In one 
of the recorded conversations, Kolodesh indicated that he 
wanted to put money in a Swiss bank account, but he wanted 
to avoid one particular bank because “[it] reports everything 
to the American government.”  (App. at 1284.)  
 
 The recorded conversations were thus relevant as 
circumstantial evidence of Kolodesh’s knowledge that his 
actions were fraudulent and that he risked losing his money as 
a result.  They were also relevant as circumstantial evidence 
of knowledge regarding the money laundering charges.  
Although the discussions about possibly putting money into 
Swiss accounts was not part of those charged offenses, the 
conversations provided evidence of Kolodesh’s intent to 
maintain access to criminally derived property and conceal 
such transactions from the government.  The mere possibility 
of a negative inference regarding Swiss bank accounts did not 
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substantially outweigh the probative value of the recordings.  
Thus, the District Court did not plainly err in admitting them.  
 
 C. Response to Jury’s Request17 
 
 Kolodesh argues that the District Court erred in failing 
to provide the jury with transcripts of testimony that the jury 
requested and, further, in failing to suspend jury deliberations 
until those transcripts could be provided.  After the jury began 
deliberating, it sent a note asking for a transcript of Pugman’s 
testimony, “both direct and cross,” and noting that, “[i]f 
possible,” the transcript “may be edited to cover only 
testimony regarding continuous care.”  (App. at 4611.)  The 
jury requested the same for Ganetsky’s testimony and a full 
transcript for the testimony of Cecilia Wiley, Home Care 
Hospice’s office manager.  After obtaining the agreement of 
counsel, the District Court instructed the jury that it would not 
be possible to provide only the portions of the transcript 
relating to continuous care.  The Court also noted the length 
of the full testimony for Pugman and Ganetsky and told the 
jury it had two options: it could either rely on its recollection 
of the testimony or “request the entire transcript of Ganetsky 
and Pugman or either one or both.”  (App. at 4622.)  The 
Court then sent the jury back to decide what it wanted to do.  
The record is not entirely clear, but the jury may have sent a 
note back requesting the full transcript of Pugman’s and 
Wiley’s testimonies, though not Ganetsky’s.  (See App. at 
                                              
 17 Because Kolodesh failed to raise a contemporaneous 
objection, we review for plain error.  United States v. 
Salahuddin, 765 F.3d 329, 337 (3d Cir. 2014), petition for 
cert. filed, 83 U.S.L.W. 3558 (U.S. Dec. 2, 2014) (No. 14-
654). 
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4623-26 (defense counsel discussing all three witnesses and 
indicating that the jury had requested Wiley’s testimony 
twice); id. at 4630 (District Court stating when jury returned, 
“I have received your request for the transcripts of Alex 
Pugman and Cecilia Wiley”).)  In any event, after discussing 
the matter further with counsel, the District Court instructed 
the jury that a transcript of Wiley’s testimony was not 
available but that the jury could rely on its recollection or 
come back into court and have the audio recording of the 
testimony played in its entirety.  “As to Alex Pugman’s 
transcript,” the Court explained, “that is available and it will 
be delivered to you.  It may take a little bit of time because it 
has to be edited to take the sidebars out of the transcript that 
has been developed.”  (App. at 4631.)  Before sending the 
jury back to the jury room, the District Court summarized, 
“So if possible, continue your deliberation on these and other 
issues as you wish while the Pugman transcript is being 
edited, and as far as Wiley is concerned, those are the choices 
that you have.”  (Id.)  Just over two hours later, the jury 
returned a verdict.   
 
 As the foregoing record indicates, the District Court 
did not fail to make the transcript or recordings available to 
the jury; it expressly told the jury that it had a choice as to 
how to proceed regarding the Wiley testimony, that the 
Pugman transcript would be given as soon as it was available, 
and that it was free to continue deliberation as it wished.18  
                                              
18 We reject Kolodesh’s contention that, by failing to 
mention Ganetsky’s testimony when the jury returned, the 
District Court tacitly rejected the jury’s request for her 
testimony.  As noted above, the jury appears to have 
withdrawn that request.  But even if that reading of the record 
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That the jury ultimately chose to rely on its recollection of the 
witnesses’ testimonies does not indicate that the Court should 
have halted proceedings.  The handling of such matters is 
within the “broad discretion” of the trial court, United States 
v. Bertoli, 40 F.3d 1384, 1400 (3d Cir. 1994) (internal 
quotation marks omitted), and how the Court proceeded in 
this instance was not in any way an abuse of that discretion, 
let alone a problem rising to the level of plain error. 
 
 D. Sentencing 
 
 Finally, Kolodesh challenges the procedural and 
substantive reasonableness of his sentence, including the 
District Court’s restitution order. 
 
                                                                                                     
is inaccurate, we do not believe the jury would have 
interpreted the District Court’s comments as a reversal of the 
earlier instruction to the jury that it could rely on its own 
recollection of Ganetsky’s testimony or request a full 
transcript.   
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  1. Alleged Procedural Error19 
 
 First, Kolodesh argues that the government did not 
establish that the health care fraud in this case resulted in a 
$16.2 million loss, and, therefore, the twenty-level loss-
enhancement imposed under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
was inappropriate.  See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(K).  An agent 
who worked on the case testified at sentencing that he 
calculated the loss based on Pugman’s and Ganetsky’s 
testimony as to the percentage of continuous care claims that 
were fraudulent, 90-99.5%, and the percentage of patients 
who did not qualify even for non-continuous hospice care, 
30-33%.  Using the lower estimates, the agent multiplied 
those percentages by the respective dollar amounts of claims 
submitted between 2003 and 2008, $1.7 million for 
                                              
 19 In United States v. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253 (3d 
Cir. 2014) (en banc), we concluded that a defendant must 
object after a sentence is pronounced to preserve a claim 
based on “failure to give meaningful consideration” to the 
defendant’s objections.  Id. at 256.  That rule, however, does 
not apply to sentences such as Kolodesh’s that were entered 
before Flores-Mejia was decided.  Id. at 259.  Furthermore, 
Kolodesh does not challenge the adequacy of the District 
Court’s consideration of the objections he raised.  He instead 
challenges the District Court’s application of the Sentencing 
Guidelines, and in particular the Court’s factual findings in 
support of the Guidelines calculations it made.  Therefore, our 
review is for abuse of discretion.  United States v. Wise, 515 
F.3d 207, 217 (3d Cir. 2008).  “[A] district court will be held 
to have abused its discretion if its decision was based on a 
clearly erroneous factual conclusion or an erroneous legal 
conclusion.”  Id.   
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continuous care and $48.9 million for non-continuous care, 
resulting in a total loss of $16.2 million.  Kolodesh argues 
that Pugman and Ganetsky were not competent to testify as to 
the percentage of fraudulent claims and that the government 
provided no foundation for their testimonies.  He says that, 
based on expert testimony he advanced at the sentencing 
hearing, statistical sampling was needed to establish an 
accurate estimate of loss in this case.   
 
 The District Court did not clearly err in concluding 
that the government proved a $16.2 million loss.  Pugman and 
Ganetsky each testified extensively at trial regarding their 
intimate involvement in the management of Home Care 
Hospice and, together with Kolodesh, their direction of the 
company’s fraudulent activities.  It is difficult to imagine who 
would have been more competent to testify based on personal 
knowledge as to the loss involved in this case.  Furthermore, 
“[t]here is no rule that a district court must rely upon 
statistical analysis in a situation such as this to determine the 
amount of loss pursuant to section 2B1.1.”  United States v. 
Jones, 641 F.3d 706, 712 (6th Cir. 2011) (making that 
statement as a general proposition in a health care fraud case, 
but reversing because the district court relied solely on a 
flawed statistical analysis).  And as the application notes to 
the Sentencing Guidelines indicate, “[t]he court need only 
make a reasonable estimate of the loss.”  U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 
app. n.3(C).  We find no error in the District Court’s 
application of the loss enhancement.  
 
 Next, Kolodesh argues that the District Court erred in 
applying a four-level enhancement based on his role as an 
organizer or leader of the fraudulent activity.  See U.S.S.G. 
§ 3B1.1(a).  He points to evidence adduced at trial indicating 
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that he had no control over the fraud and instead was, at most, 
“a passive, silent partner” in Home Care Hospice.  (Opening 
Br. at 56.)  Although he acknowledges the existence of 
damning testimony by Pugman and Ganetsky, he argues that 
they were “simply not credible.”  (Opening Br. at 57.)  We 
decline Kolodesh’s invitation to reweigh the evidence or 
reassess the witnesses’ credibility.  Pugman and Ganetsky 
repeatedly testified at trial that Kolodesh was intimately 
involved in directing the fraudulent scheme.  Although the 
jury could have chosen to reject Pugman’s and Ganetsky’s 
testimony and believe Kolodesh’s version of events, it did 
not.  The District Court’s finding that Kolodesh was an 
organizer or leader of the fraudulent activity is in line with the 
jury’s verdict, and Kolodesh has pointed to nothing in the 
record that would make the District Court’s finding clearly 
erroneous.  See United States v. Igbonwa, 120 F.3d 437, 440-
41 (3d Cir. 1997) (stating that under the clearly erroneous 
standard, the reviewing court does not “conduct a de novo 
review of the evidence” but considers “whether there is 
enough evidence in the record to support the factual findings 
of the district court,” or, in the context of credibility 
determinations, whether “the district court’s decision is based 
on testimony that is coherent and plausible, not internally 
inconsistent and not contradicted by external evidence”). 
 
 Kolodesh’s final procedural challenge relates to the 
District Court’s imposition of a two-level sentencing 
enhancement for obstruction of justice.  See U.S.S.G. 
§ 3C1.1.  During trial, Alexy Drobot – a witness for the 
government who, as noted earlier, had contracted with Home 
Care Hospice to service its copy machine – testified that 
Kolodesh came to his office shortly before Drobot was 
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scheduled to testify.20  Drobot was not there, but Kolodesh 
had Drobot’s secretary call and ask him to meet Kolodesh at 
Community Home Health.  When Drobot refused, Kolodesh 
proposed a meeting at Starbucks.  Drobot agreed and they met 
over coffee for about fifteen minutes.  The only thing they 
discussed was Drobot’s upcoming testimony.  Kolodesh 
mentioned that Drobot would probably get called as a witness 
the following week, and Kolodesh said, “don’t bury me.”  
(App. at 2977.)  Drobot responded that he would not perjure 
himself but would “tell the truth and be done with this.”  
(App. at 2978.)  Drobot acknowledged on cross-examination 
that Kolodesh did not threaten him or ask him to lie or to 
change his testimony.   
 
 Again, Kolodesh is simply rearguing the weight of the 
evidence, without pointing to anything that shows the District 
Court clearly erred in finding that he willfully attempted to 
obstruct or impede the administration of justice.  We 
conclude, therefore, that the District Court did not commit 
procedural error in applying the challenged enhancements. 
                                              
 20 Drobot testified at trial about the agreement he had 
with Kolodesh and Pugman to provide them with fake 
invoices in return for a portion of the funds used to pay those 
invoices.   
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  2. Substantive Reasonableness21 
 
 Kolodesh challenges the substantive reasonableness of 
his sentence by arguing that he “did not orchestrate the fraud 
committed by [Home Care Hospice]” and that he “suffers 
from several physical and emotional conditions” that will 
prevent him from committing further crimes and make him an 
inappropriate candidate for a long term of incarceration.  
(Opening Br. at 62, 63.)  He also says that the imposition of a 
large sentence and large restitution amount renders the 
sentence doubly harsh.  We have already disposed of 
Kolodesh’s challenge to his role in the fraudulent scheme.  
See supra p. 24.  As to Kolodesh’s physical condition, the 
District Court concluded that the Bureau of Prisons was “fully 
equipped and … well positioned to provide appropriate 
medical attention to Mr. Kolodesh’s ailments.”  (Supp. App. 
at 12.)  Kolodesh recites his ailments but does nothing to 
challenge the Court’s conclusion or to show why his ailments 
are so incapacitating that he could not commit any further 
offenses.  Finally, the combination of a lengthy imprisonment 
term with a large restitution order does not render a sentence 
unreasonable.  Cf., e.g., United States v. Lewis, 557 F.3d 601, 
613-15 (8th Cir. 2009) (upholding the substantive 
reasonableness of a sentence of 204 months’ imprisonment in 
a case involving a restitution order of $39 million, although 
                                              
 21 We review the substantive reasonableness of a 
sentence for abuse of discretion.  Wise, 515 F.3d at 218.  “[I]f 
the district court’s sentence is procedurally sound, we will 
affirm it unless no reasonable sentencing court would have 
imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for 
the reasons the district court provided.”  United States v. 
Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
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the defendant there did not argue that the length of 
imprisonment and size of restitution combined to render the 
sentence unreasonable).  Rather, we must “take into account 
the totality of the circumstances” as we consider the 
reasonableness of the sentence under the facts of each case.  
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).   
 
 Under a common understanding of the term, restitution 
is just what its name denotes: a restoring of victims to their 
state before the crime, as nearly as possible.22  Viewed that 
way, it is akin to compensatory damages in a civil suit rather 
than punitive damages.  The Supreme Court, however, has 
stated that there is a punitive aspect to restitution orders in a 
criminal case, see Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 
1726 (2014) (“The primary goal of restitution is remedial or 
compensatory, but it also serves punitive purposes.” (citation 
omitted)), and we are bound to follow that.  Yet even though 
restitution has been deemed to serve “punitive purposes,” its 
“primary goal” is still “remedial or compensatory,” id., and 
we see no reason why imposing restitution in an amount 
                                              
 22 See Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 996 
(10th ed. 2002) (defining “restitution” as “1: an act of 
restoring or a condition of being restored: as a: a restoration 
of something to its rightful owner b: a making good of or 
giving an equivalent for some injury 2: a legal action serving 
to cause restoration of a previous state,” defining “restitute” 
as “1: to restore to a former state or position 2: GIVE BACK; 
esp: REFUND,” and defining “restore” as “1: GIVE BACK, 
RETURN 2: to put or bring back into existence or use 3: to 
bring back to or put back into a former or original state: 
RENEW 4: to put again in possession of something” 
(emphases omitted)). 
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equal to the loss actually caused by Kolodesh and his co-
conspirators would, when coupled with a lengthy term of 
imprisonment that is otherwise reasonable, render the 
sentence substantively unreasonable.  Moreover, the District 
Court here granted a downward departure,23 imposing a 
sentence of 176 months’ imprisonment in the face of a 
guidelines range of 188 to 235 months.  The justifications 
given for the sentence are reasonable.   
 
  3. Restitution24 
 
 Kolodesh argues that the government did not 
adequately prove the amount of loss and that, in any event, 
the District Court erred by holding him jointly and severally 
liable for the full amount of loss rather than for the portion he 
caused.  Kolodesh’s first argument is answered by our 
already-stated conclusion regarding the District Court’s 
factual findings on the loss amount.  See supra pp. 22-23.  His 
second argument is foreclosed by the very language of the 
statute authorizing restitution, which explicitly provides for 
joint and several liability in the full amount: 
 
If the court finds that more than 1 defendant has 
contributed to the loss of a victim, the court 
may make each defendant liable for payment of 
                                              
 23 The Court granted the downward departure based on 
its conclusion that the lower sentence “will satisfy the factors 
under 3553.”  (Supp. App. at 12.)  
 24 “We review the legality of a restitution order de 
novo and review specific awards for abuse of discretion.”  
United States v. Turner, 718 F.3d 226, 235 (3d Cir. 2013). 
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the full amount of restitution or may apportion 
liability among the defendants to reflect the 
level of contribution to the victim’s loss and 
economic circumstances of each defendant. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 3664(h).   
 
 Kolodesh relies on the Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in Paroline, but that case cannot serve him in these 
circumstances.  Paroline interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 2259, a 
mandatory restitution statute specific to Chapter 110 of the 
United States criminal code, which covers sexual exploitation 
and other abuse of children.  134 S. Ct. at 1716.  The opinion 
was specifically concerned with the application of § 2259 to 
the crime of possessing child pornography.  Id.  The Supreme 
Court vacated an en banc decision of the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit that had “held that § 2259 did 
not limit restitution to losses proximately caused by the 
defendant, and each defendant who possessed the victim’s 
images should be made liable for the victim’s entire losses 
from the trade in her images, even though other offenders 
played a role in causing those losses.”  Id. at 1718.  While the 
Supreme Court held that “a court applying § 2259 should 
order restitution in an amount that comports with the 
defendant’s relative role in the causal process that underlies 
the victim’s general losses,” it explicitly limited that holding 
to the “special context” at issue in the case.  Id. at 1727.  
Regardless of whether the words “special context” refer only 
to possession-of-child-pornography offenses or, more 
broadly, to any offense which might involve an “atypical 
causal process” underlying the victim’s losses, id. at 1722, no 
such special context exists here.  This case involves 
straightforward consideration of moneys obtained by fraud.  
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Paroline does not alter the long-standing availability of joint-
and-several liability in circumstances such as this.25  The 
District Court’s restitution order is thoroughly sound. 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm Kolodesh’s 
conviction and sentence. 
                                              
 25 Section 2259, the statute at issue in Paroline, 
incorporates the enforcement procedures of § 3664.  See 18 
U.S.C. § 2259(b)(2) (“An order of restitution under this 
section shall be issued and enforced in accordance with 
section 3664 in the same manner as an order under section 
3663A[, which governs mandatory restitution to victims of 
certain crimes].”).  As noted above, § 3664 grants the district 
court discretion to impose joint and several liability or to 
apportion liability.  Id. § 3664(h).  Again, nothing in Paroline 
suggests that the Court was foreclosing the statutorily 
authorized imposition of joint and several liability in the 
typical case. 
